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Abstract 
The increasing impact of the Internet in the global economy has transformed Botnets into one 
of the most relevant security threats for citizens, organizations and governments. Despite the 
significant efforts that have been made over the last years to understand this phenomenon and 
develop detection techniques and countermeasures, this continues to be a field with big 
challenges to address. Several approaches can be taken to study Botnets: analyze its source 
code, which can be a hard task because it is usually unavailable; study the control mechanism, 
particularly the activity of its Command and Control server(s); study its behavior, by 
measuring real traffic and collecting relevant statistics. In this work, we have installed some 
of the most popular spam Botnets, captured the originated traffic and characterized it in order 
to identify the main trends/patterns of their activity. From the intensive statistics that were 
collected, it was possible to conclude that there are distinct features between Botnets that can 
be explored to build efficient detection methodologies. Based on this study, the second part of 
the paper proposes a generic and systematic model to describe the network dynamics 
whenever a Botnet threat is detected, defining all actors, dimensions, states and actions that 
need to be taken into account at each moment. We believe that this type of modeling 
approach is the basis for developing systematic and integrated frameworks and strategies to 
predict and fight Botnet threats in an efficient way. 
 
Keywords: Spam Botnet, statistical characterization, network security, malware, network 
resilience model.  
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1. Introduction  
In the last years, communication networks have expanded their usage, importance and 
impact levels in the global economy. Nowadays, significant parts of our daily lives are 
directly or indirectly related with the Internet, with the use of services like the e-mail, online 
news or entertainment, teleworking, business transactions, home banking, social networks 
and much more. This importance and dependence degree raised this network to the level of a 
global critical infrastructure, where possible failures and disruptions have a tremendous 
impact in the global economy. However, in many aspects this new importance level was not 
accompanied by an increase of its reliability, availability and security [1] or, in other terms, 
resilience [2]. From the three disciplines that mainly characterize network resilience, security 
is the most challenging one.  
The range of security threats that can affect Internet is immense and increasingly 
complex, reinforced with the beginning of a new era where cyber-war between nations is a 
reality. Network security is a very broad topic that includes issues like confidentiality, 
authenticity, integrity, authorization or non-repudiability. The lack of security on computers 
and networks is created, in a first instance, by the existence of vulnerabilities that can become 
a threat. Threats can become attacks, which can result in compromised systems. One of the 
most common security threats in current networks and computer systems is the use of 
software with malicious functionalities, known as malware. Malware is a generic term that 
encompasses specific malicious pieces of software like rootkit, virus, worm, spyware, trojan 
horse, sniffer and many others. A large set of infected computers (bots) that is remotely and 
coordinately controlled by an attacker (botmaster) is known as a Botnet. Although Botnets are 
used for many different malicious purposes, nowadays the most relevant uses are for political 
and financial benefits [3]. 
From a defender’s perspective, it is very important to understand the trends and practices 
of Botnets. There are several approaches to study this phenomenon: analyze its source code, 
study the activity of its Command and Control (C&C) server(s), study the generated traffic by 
allowing a chosen machine to become infected by an executable bot and analyzing all 
possible scanning activities/actions triggered by the Botnet. In this work, we used this 
approach to characterize the traffic generated by each bot: we have installed some of the most 
popular spam Botnets by allowing the infection of a selected machine, captured the 
exchanged traffic and processed it in order to obtain relevant statistics that could be used to 
build characteristic patterns/behaviors for each Botnet. Grum, Cutwail and Bobax were the 
selected spam Botnets, mainly due to their activity importance level. The results obtained 
show that there are some distinct features between different types of spam Botnets (like, for 
example, the temporal evolution on the number of contacted peers or the variety of protocols 
involved in the communications between bots and C&C servers) that can be explored to build 
efficient detection methodologies. In fact, a deep understanding of some Botnets or Botnet 
types (and their corresponding behaviors) can be used to define heuristic rules, based on 
traffic statistics, in order to identify their activity and trigger subsequent actions to prevent 
generalized infections. 
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Whenever a Botnet is detected, it is necessary to deploy appropriate countermeasures that 
should limit the threat and/or eliminate it. Countermeasures can be grouped into three main 
categories: technical, regulatory and social methods [4]. If the identification of possible 
countermeasures that can fight and remove Botnet threats in a local network is nowadays 
reasonably well achieved, their systematic application needs to be significantly improved. 
Cleaning infected machines using anti-virus software, applying traffic filtering rules or 
blocking network elements’ ports are relatively common measures taken by network 
administrators in the case of a Botnet detection. However, since these threats become more 
and more sophisticated, the fighting procedures need to be systematized and automated. 
Besides, having the ability to model all network states (from a security perspective) can help 
predict future network states/behaviors based on available (input) events. This 
systematization will obviously allow the deployment of automated countermeasures for any 
detected threat. So, this paper also proposes a generic network model that is able to describe 
the different network dynamics under the presence of a Botnet threat: all actors, dimensions, 
states and actions that need to be taken into account at each moment will be defined, allowing 
the development of appropriate inference procedures that can infer the values of different 
model parameters based on real data. So, the main goal is to define an exact model of the 
procedure flows that are necessary to cope with a machine or system infected or 
compromised by a particular Botnet type. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the most relevant background on 
Botnet infrastructures, detection approaches and countermeasures; Section 3 describes the 
characterization methodology that was used in this work, presents the spam Botnets that were 
selected and the main obtained results, including a brief discussion on them; Section 4 
presents the modeling approach, including all possible network states and all actions that 
originate state transitions, besides discussing the necessary steps to infer the model 
parameters and use it to help network managers and administrators; finally, Section 5 presents 
the main conclusions. 
 
2. Background on Botnets  
A Botnet is a large collection of computing systems that is infected with the same piece 
of malware (bot) and is remotely controlled by one or more attackers (botmasters), using a 
specific C&C infrastructure [1], with the purpose of performing malicious actions like 
sending spam email, triggering distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS), capturing 
private information or propagating other types of malware. Infected computers and networks 
become unstable and, frequently, unable to operate normally. 
Nowadays, it is estimated that millions of infected systems exist in the Internet, being 
part of thousands of Botnets. According to Fossi et al. [5], the Rustock Botnet controlled 
more than 1 million bots. If in the last years economic benefit has been the major motivation 
for Botnet deployment, recently we are witnessing its increasing use for political purposes [6], 
[7] and for several underground cybercrime activities [3]: unsolicited mass mailing (SPAM), 
click frauds and pay per install, identity theft, DDoS. 
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2.1 Botnet infrastructures 
The Botnet C&C infrastructure includes bots and a control entity, using an addressing 
mechanism and one or more protocols to maintain a communication channel and distribute 
commands between the infected computers and the botmasters [8]. The C&C infrastructure 
can have a centralized, decentralized or locomotive based architecture. 
In a centralized architecture bots act only as clients, connecting and receiving commands 
from one or more servers. This architecture is based on a client-server communication model, 
where HTTP and IRC are the most common communication protocols. According to Fossi et 
al. [9], in 2009 HTTP was used on around 69% of all detected Botnets, while the remaining 
31% where based on the IRC protocol, which continues to have an important role essentially 
due to its simplicity and ability to support a potentially unlimited number of participants 
commanded in parallel through a single channel. Private conversations are also supported, 
being possible to send commands to individual bots. The use of HTTP has obvious 
advantages: HTTP is a text-based protocol that uses easy to implement request-response 
methods and, due to its generalized utilization, avoids its traffic to be normally blocked by 
firewalls and anti-virus. Centralized infrastructures can be based on single central C&C 
servers or in a multilayered structure of servers and bots. In this second alternative, servers 
can be divided into different roles: some can be used for command and control and others for 
delivering contents to bots. Bots can also perform different roles in the Botnet structure. 
In decentralized architectures, also known as peer-to-peer architectures, there is no 
differentiation between clients and servers. All nodes participating in the Botnet perform the 
same set of roles, being known as peers. The communication protocol is also based in 
peer-to-peer models. With this architecture, botmasters control bots by inserting commands 
and updates in an arbitrary point of the Botnet, which makes their localization almost 
impossible and provides a very high degree of anonymity. There are no central servers to 
mitigate and disable. However, the propagation of commands through the Botnet is slower 
when compared to centralized approaches. There are some Botnets that use hybrid 
infrastructures, with a centralized infrastructure as the primary option and an alternative 
peer-to-peer backup channel. 
Locomotive Botnets use a central C&C infrastructure that is constantly moving over time. 
This means that the C&C servers are continuously changing, with the support of the DNS 
service.  
A highly complex DNS-based technique was used by Botnet developers to increase its 
resilience and anonymity: the so called fast-flux service [3]. Fast flux is a DNS technique 
used by botnets to hide phishing and malware delivery sites behind an ever-changing network 
of compromised hosts acting as proxies. The basic idea behind this technique is to have 
numerous IP addresses associated with a single fully qualified domain name, where the IP 
addresses are swapped in and out with extremely high frequency, through changing DNS 
records. With this service, it is possible to use several bots as proxy servers to transparently 
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forward malicious communications from clients to a malicious server. The proxy servers hide 
to the outside the malicious services that are available in the malicious server. The main 
characteristic of this mechanism is the use of round-robin DNS with very short TTL values 
associated with the DNS resource records in order to rapidly and continuously change the IP 
addresses of the bot proxies, being extremely difficult to follow and intercept these 
communications. 
2.2 Botnet detection and countermeasures 
Since Botnets act with discretion, their detection is very challenging. One of the solutions 
that have been used for Botnet detection and tracking is based on honeynets [10], a set of 
honeypots. An honeypot is an intentionally insecure computational system that is placed in 
the network with the objective of detecting and capturing traffic from Botnets in order to 
understand their characteristics and modus operandi. The most important Botnet detection 
techniques that have been proposed are based on passive monitoring and analysis of the 
network traffic, and can be classified into four main categories [11], [12]: 
 Signature-based: these techniques are based on previous knowledge about malware 
and Botnets. One known example is the Snort [13] tool, an open source intrusion detection 
system (IDS). The main drawback of this type of systems is that they can only detect known 
Botnets and malware. 
 Anomaly-based: these techniques are based on the detection of traffic anomalies, 
like high volumes of traffic, high delay or jitter, unusual ports or unusual system behavior 
[14]. However, if the Botnet traffic seems to have normal patterns, this type of methods 
cannot detect it. Botsniffer [15] is an anomaly-based detection tool. 
 DNS-based: these techniques apply the same principles of the anomaly-based 
techniques to the specific case of DNS traffic. 
 Mining-based: since the other techniques are not effective to detect C&C traffic, this 
approach uses data mining techniques to perform this identification. In reference [16], Masud 
et al. presented a very promising data mining identification methodology. 
When a Botnet is detected, it is necessary to do all the possible to mitigate the threat, 
taking measures to shut it down if possible. Because of the dissimulated nature of these 
systems, this is a challenging task. The most common approach is based on searching for 
central weak points in the Botnet infrastructure that can be disrupted or blocked. In general, 
two main approaches exist: classical countermeasures and offensive strategies [8]. In the 
classical countermeasures group, the three most common used techniques are: 
 Taking down the C&C server. Whenever possible, this is the most effective and fast 
way to shut down the Botnet. However, it is only applicable to Botnets with a central 
infrastructure and if the location of the C&C server is known. The cooperation of the service 
provider where the server is connected to is fundamental in this step. Besides, depending on 
the Botnets, bots can be prepared to spread and perform tasks autonomously, without 
communicating with the C&C server. 
 Sinkholing malicious traffic. If shutting down the C&C server is not possible, the 
traffic between bots and this server can be redirected to a sinkhole. This can be done at the 
 Network Protocols and Algorithms 
ISSN 1943-3581 
2012, Vol. 4, No. 4 
www.macrothink.org/npa 7 
routing level, either in a local or global scale, obviously depending on the cooperation 
between organizations and ISPs. 
 Cleaning infected systems. If this is the most sustainable measure to eliminate a 
Botnet threat, it is also the most difficult due to the extremely large spectrum of client 
systems that normally are infected, covering many different geographical areas, different 
types of users, etc. The most common approaches are based on the use of up-to-date 
anti-virus and personal firewalls in the end user systems. However, usually these tasks are not 
controlled by the network and system administrators, which make them so difficult to 
implement. 
The effective implementation of classical countermeasures clearly depends on the 
organizational and political cooperation between different entities, which is usually a slow 
process when compared to the urgency that is required to fight these threats. Additionally, the 
most recent Botnet threats use increasingly sophisticated obfuscation techniques that make 
the application of classical countermeasures even more difficult. To solve these limitations, 
some new proactive offensive approaches have been proposed [8]: 
 Mitigation: an offensive approach against the Botnet infrastructure, similar to 
temporary DoS attacks to C&C servers, trapping and blocking connections from infected 
machines or malicious domains. 
 Manipulation: this approach relies on bugs found in bots to access the C&C channel, 
intercepting commands and forge new fake commands to change their behavior. In the limit, 
fake commands can order the bots self-destruction. 
 Exploitation: this approach explores bugs in the C&C servers or even in the bots to 
gain control over them and promote their destruction from inside. 
Despite being technically feasible and very effective, these types of techniques raise 
several ethical and legal questions, as the name (offensive) suggests. If fact, the use of these 
techniques usually implies the unauthorized access to infected machines and infrastructures, 
which means using the same (and many times illegal) rules as the attackers. 
In [17] the authors proposed a new approach for collective cyber threat defense efforts 
based on the public health models that are used in several countries. In this proposal, authors 
defend the use of health certificates for all systems connected to the Internet. These 
certificates demonstrate the health condition of each device and can be used by service 
providers to allow or block access to specific resources (like home banking platforms, for 
example). Despite being an interesting theoretical approach, many practical questions need to 
be addressed in order to implement this model, ranging from the specification of certificates 
and protocols to the construction of a global infrastructure that can manage the system. 
Another innovative approach is described in [18], where the authors propose the idea of 
using virtual bots to create uncertainty in the attack capacity of each Botnet. This study 
advocates that this uncertainty has a significant impact on the profits of botmasters and 
attackers, which means that the economic benefits can be destroyed or mitigated and the 
corresponding interest in using the Botnet will automatically decrease. 
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3. Analyzing Spam Botnets 
3.1 Analysis Methodology and Selected Botnets 
We have installed three popular spam Botnets by allowing the infection of a selected 
machine with the corresponding malware. The generated traffic was captured using wireshark 
[19] and processed a posteriori in order to obtain relevant statistics. Fig. 1 illustrates the data 
measurement/collection framework. 
Since some bots have the ability to detect Virtual Machines (VMs), VMs were not used. 
The honeypot machine was always formatted before each infection, in order to prevent 
interference between the traffic generated by different Botnets. The operating system (OS) 
was Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 3, since it is one of the most targeted OSs. In [20] it 
was possible to find malware for each one of the selected Botnets. The captures lasted for 48 
hours, giving the possibility to better infer the behavior of each Botnet and observe its pattern 
in a long time basis. No other tasks were being performed on the infected computer while it 
was capturing traffic, in order to reduce any other generated traffic besides the one 
corresponding to the Botnet activity. 
Several parameters/statistics of the traffic flows were collected/calculated, like for 
example: the flow starting/ending instant, the protocols involved, the number and type of 
active flags on TCP flows, the number of exchanged packets, the number of exchanged bytes, 
the flow duration, the contacted peers and their geographical location, the number of DNS 
queries and the periodicity of the communications. 
 
Figure 1. Framework for measuring Botnets traffic and inferring the most important statistics. 
According to [21], the top ten spam Botnets in June 2011, in terms of percentage of spam, 
volume of spam per day, size and infected countries are the ones represented in Table I. 
Appropriate malware was obtained for three of these Botnets: Grum, Cutwail and Bobax. 
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Table 1. Top ten spam Botnets in June 2011. 
Botnet % of Spam Volume of Spam Per Day Estimated Size Most Infected Countries 
Cutwail 16.1 9.6 Billions 800K to 1.2M India (10%), Russia (9%) 
Xarvester 6.7 4 Billions 57K to 86K UK (18%), France (13%) 
Maazben 3.1 1.9 Billions 520K to 780K South Korea (14%), Russia (10%) 
Lethic 3.1 1.8 Billions 230K to 340K South Korea (25%), Russia (15%) 
Grum 3.0 1.8 Billions 200K to 290K India (14%), Russia (14%) 
Bagle 2.7 1.6 Billions 140K to 200K India (15%), Argentina (8%) 
Fivetoone 2.3 1.4 Billions 94K to 140K Vietnam (20%), Brazil (12%) 
Festi 1.2 691 Millions 25K to 37K India (10%), Vietnam (10%) 
Bobax 0.4 254 Millions 80K to 120K Ukraine (27%), India (8%) 
DarkMailer 0.5 43 Millions 1K to 1.5K France (27%), USA (16%) 
Grum, also known as Tedroo, mainly focus its activity on pharmaceutical products. It 
usually infects files referenced by the auto-run registries. This Botnet is able to hide 
component files as well as legitimate Windows system files, making its detection and 
removal quite difficult [22]. It has five key features: a Kernel-based root-kit; reports to a 
C&C server via HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) on port 80; downloads plain text spam 
templates and address lists from a web-server; has multiple control servers and performs 
DNS MX lookups to send spam. This Botnet tries to establish a control server connection, 
using an email message, by sending an HTTP request message. Depending on the variant of 
the Botnet, Grum makes changes in the System Registry. 
Cutwail, also referred as Pandex or Pushdo, among other names, has been active since 
2007 and mainly focus in sending spam promoting pharmaceuticals, designer rip-offs or 
software. It also distributes malware regularly, sending emails attachments, usually .zip files. 
Nowadays, this Botnet also sends malicious campaigns, using social networking brands, 
distributing also phishing emails mainly targeting customers of several financial institutions. 
The main Cutwail’s features are: reports to a C&C server on port 80, resorting to encrypted 
HTTP and performs DNS lookups to send spam and uses templates. The Cutwail behavior is 
described in detail in reference [22]: it connects to its control server using HTTP, through port 
80, using an encrypted tunnel, and listens on a random UDP port for commands from its 
control server. At the host, it is able to download malware and, after installing it, it creates 
different processes, mainly with the purpose of notifying the Botmaster and running its 
commands. 
Bobax, which can also be found under the name of Kraken or Oderoor, has been working 
since 2007 and has the following features: reports to control server using UDP, through port 
447; uses dynamic domain name providers; performs DNS MX lookups to send spam; has 
multiple recipients per message; uses templates and has backdoor capabilities. Bobax starts 
by checking for a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) connection to a server site, through 
port 25. Then, it generates a pseudo-random domain name, and if the DNS query fails, it will 
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append the domain name on the local network of the infected machine to perform a new DNS 
query. Once it successfully finds the C&C server, it sends an HTTP request [22]. Like 
Cutwail, it creates processes to execute on Windows start-up, and hides its malware 
registering itself as a random service name. It has also the capability of searching for 
potential email addresses. After this process, it receives a template from the server to send to 
its targets. 
3.1 Results Obtained 
3.1.1 Grum Botnet 
Immediately after installing the malware, DNS queries started being made to one of 
Google’s DNS (8.8.8.8) during 100 seconds, with a periodicity of 50 seconds. After this 
period, most of the traffic that was filtered as TCP Unknown used port 80, so it is in fact 
HTTP traffic. Traffic filtered as HTTP was generated during 150 seconds, also with a 
periodicity of 50 seconds, consisting of various GET requests for different types of files 
(.exe, .gif, .png). After some time, Unknown TCP packets (directed through port 445) were 
exchanged, corresponding to a communication of the Server Message Block (SMB) over 
TCP/IP. The objective of this activity was to find shared files. A Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP) packet was then received, including information that is necessary to get options from an 
IP address. These packets continued to appear sporadically. Besides, several attempts for 
Secure Shell (SSH) and Telnet connections were also made. Recurrently, there were some 
packets being exchanged through port 6000, which has been reported in the literature as a 
port used by virus or trojans. Some SMTP packets were also detected over time, reinforcing 
the idea of spam intents. The capture that was made followed a regular trend, with the vast 
majority of the packets belonging to HTTP and SMB. These packets continuously queried 
services through the NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS) and tried to establish sessions using the 
NetBIOS Session Service (NBSS). By looking at Fig. 2, we can clearly see that most of the 
generated traffic was filtered as unknown TCP. In the Upload direction, there are some HTTP 
and DNS packets in the first hour. After that, besides unknown TCP, there are also some SMB 
and unknown UDP packets. In the Download direction, it is possible to observe few packets 
from three different protocols (HTTP, DNS and SMB), although this only happens in the first 
hour. 
The number of generated packets (left part of Fig. 3) increased over time, being always 
higher in the download direction. There are peaks in the amount of generated traffic around 
hours 23, 37 and 43: in these peaks, it is possible to observe an increase of SMB session 
requests, as well as Remote Management requests. Grum generated a very limited amount of 
traffic, around 10 KB per hour. As expected from the amount of received packets, the amount 
of download traffic was also always higher than the amount of upload traffic. 
We can see from the right part of Fig. 3 that there was a fairly regular amount of peers 
contacted per hour, except for the peak on the 28
th
 hour, where six times more peers were 
contacted than usual. This peak was the result of several attempts of TCP Session 
Establishment that were not successful. The session establishment attempts originated in the 
infected machine followed the expected behavior, since most of the packets generated in 
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response to SYN packets had the SYN/ACK flags active. However, the session establishment 
attempts received by the infected machine generated more packets with the RST/ACK flags 
active than packets with the SYN/ACK flags active, which means that the majority of the 
session establishments attempts were not successful. Like we said before, there is a strange 
peak of 60 peers contacted per hour, which is a consequence of this high number of 
RST/ACK packets. In the 28
th
 hour of the capture, a total of 84 RST/ACK packets were sent 
from the infected machine. 
Finally, it is interesting to see the world map that geographically locates the peers that 
established communication with the infected machine. From Fig. 4, it is perceivable that 
Grum’s infected machines are primarily located in Europe, Asia and America. The main 
infected countries were China and the United States of America. 
3.1.2 Cutwail Botnet 
For this Botnet, most of the packets that were filtered as Unknown TCP are also in fact 
HTTP packets. After a couple of hours, some HTTP/XML Notify packets were spontaneously 
exchanged. Some SIP Invite packets were also detected, together with some Telnet packets, 
but this activity is almost unperceivable and does not raise any suspicion. There were some 
NBNS Query packets as well, also using port 445, and a significant amount of SMB packets 
over TCP was also detected. Regarding Unknown UDP traffic, most of these messages were 
actually being exchanged for DoS attacks: in fact, many of the ports were recognized as the 
ones that are usually used for this type of security attacks. Around the third hour of the 
capture, a lot of Unknown TCP packets started being directed through port 50000. Although 
this port is known for being used by a trojan named SubSARI, this activity was related to 
protocol UPnP (Universal Plug and Play). By the end of the capture, there were some Remote 
Management packets. Once again, SMTP packets were detected but in a small quantity. 
 
Figure 2. Grum Botnet protocols: (left) upload direction; (right) download direction. 
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Figure 3. Grum Botnet statistics: (left) packets per hour; (right) unique peers per hour. 
 
Figure 4. Grum Botnet: geographical location of the contacted peers. 
The Cutwail Botnet exhibits a typical traffic pattern: it has a constant rate of sent HTTP 
packets and Unknown TCP packets, despite having a peak around hour 26, also follow a quite 
constant pattern. There is a small rate of SMB and Unknown UDP packets, which present a 
peak around the 25
th
 hour due to a high number of TCP Session Establishments. 
Protocols distribution in the download direction is quite similar to the upload distribution 
(Fig. 5), except regarding the absence of the peak in the number of Unknown UDP packets. 
In the left part of Fig. 6 we can observe that both sent and received packets follow the 
same pattern, presenting a peak in the 26
th
 hour. Once again, this peak is originated by several 
TCP Session Establishment attempts. There are almost always more Upload than Download 
packets. The right part of Fig. 6 represents the number of contacted peers per hour and we can 
see that there is a peak in the amount of contacted peers around hour 25, where the amount of 
contacted peers increases twenty times. This peak is also a result of the increase in the 
number of TCP Session Establishment attempts. It is also important to state that both captures 
contacted almost the same number of peers per hour, except at the moment of the peak 
occurrence. Most of the generated packets in response to SYN packets have the SYN/ACK 
flags active, although there are also RST/ACK packets, but in a very low number. However, 
there is a large number of unanswered SYN packets, which is not a common behavior and 
should be considered as an alarm for Botnet activity. This analysis corresponds to the session 
establishment attempts originated by the infected machine. When considering the session 
establishment attempts received by the infected machine, there are always more packets with 
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the RST/ACK flags active than packets with the SYN/ACK flags set, which means that most 
of the session establishment attempts were not successful. The peak around hour 25, which 
we have seen before, obviously conducted to this increase in the number of SYN and 
RST/ACK packets. 
Fig. 7 shows that the infected machine communicated with hosts from all continents. The 
main infected ones are however Europe and Asia. 
3.1.3 Bobax Botnet 
Traffic from Bobax followed the same behavior throughout the whole duration of the 
capture. Immediately after the malware was installed, a lot of DNS queries were exchanged 
in port 1042, known for being used by trojans. Many of these queries were actually filtered as 
Unknown UDP packets. In the experimental capture we also observed a lot of SMTP packets, 
mainly in the first hour. Most of them were filtered as Unknown TCP. Some HTTP packets 
were also exchanged, and sporadically some HTTP/XML Notify messages. Regarding 
Unknown TCP packets, and performing a deeper inspection in order to understand their true 
origin, we can say that most of them are SMB packets, with HTTP being the second protocol 
in terms of the number of packets exchanged. Around 400 thousand SMB packets were 
exchanged per hour. It was also possible to observe some NBNS packets. Unknown UDP 
packets were once again mainly used for DoS attacks, using ports that are known to be used 
for that type of security attacks. 
This Botnet definitely behave like expected, considering its amount of HTTP traffic, 
DNS lookups, DoS attacks and, essentially, SMTP packets. From Fig. 8, it is visible that most 
of the generated traffic was filtered as Unknown TCP. The Upload picture, despite showing 
mostly Unknown TCP traffic, also contains traffic from all the other protocols, although in a 
much less quantity. In the Download graph, it is possible to observe a clear pattern in DNS, 
SMB, SMTP, Unknown UDP and HTTP packets. Again, these protocols have relatively small 
number of packets when compared to the number of Unknown TCP packets. The vast 
majority of Unknown TCP packets are SMB packets, although there are also HTTP packets 
and some packets from other protocols. Unknown UDP packets are mostly DNS packets or 
packets used for DoS attempts. 
 
 
Figure 5. Cutwail Botnet protocols: (left) upload direction; (right) download direction. 
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Figure 6. Cutwail Botnet statistics: (left) packets per hour; (right) unique peers per hour. 
  
Figure 7. Cutwail Botnet: geographical location of the contacted peers. 
The left part of Fig. 9 shows that the amount of packets per hour is a clear sign that we 
are facing Botnet generated traffic. This information should be an instant warning that should 
trigger measures to protect the infected machine or the network segment. It is also important 
to stress the difference between the number of Upload and Download packets: the amount of 
Upload packets is in the order of 470 thousand packets per hour, while Download packets are 
in the order of 40 thousand packets. Even in the number of contacted peers (right part of Fig. 
9), we have a clear behavioral pattern. The observed values raise suspicions about Botnet 
infection, because they are in the order of 225 thousand contacted peers per hour. Most of the 
packets with the SYN flag active did not obtain any reply. Only a small number was replied 
with the RST/ACK flag set, and an even smaller number with the SYN/ACK flag. 
Figure 10 shows that infected machines are located everywhere in the world. The most 
infected continents are Europe and America and the countries that suffer more infections are 
the United States of America and China. 
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Figure 8. Bobax Botnet protocols: (left) upload direction; (right) download direction. 
 
Figure 9. Bobax Botnet statistics: (left) packets per hour; (right) unique peers per hour. 
 
Figure 10. Bobax Botnet: geographical location of the contacted peers. 
 
4. Modeling the Response 
Although the identification of possible countermeasures that can fight and remove 
malware and spam Botnet threats in a local network is nowadays reasonably well achieved, 
their systematic and automated application needs to be significantly improved. Cleaning 
infected machines using anti-virus software, applying traffic filtering rules or blocking the 
ports of network elements are relatively common measures taken by network administrators 
in the case of a Botnet detection. However, since these threats are becoming more 
sophisticated, the fighting procedures need to be modeled and systematized, in order to 
increase their efficiency and scalability. This systematization will also facilitate the future 
deployment of frameworks that automate the countermeasures for any detected threat [23]. 
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Thus, this section will present a generic network model that is able to describe the different 
network dynamics under the presence of a spam Botnet threat. All actors, dimensions, states 
and actions that need to be taken into account at each moment will be defined, allowing the 
development of appropriate inference procedures that can infer the values of the different 
model parameters from real data. 
The model includes the description of the different network states, according to the 
degree of Botnet infection that is detected, and the actions that lead to state transitions. The 
finite state machine model that is proposed includes a detailed characterization of the possible 
states of all network elements (hosts, layer 2 devices, routers, etc), allowing a rigorous and 
precise knowledge of the network operation details at any given time instant. The nature of 
the proposed model allows its use in the prediction of the network states at future time 
instants. 
Together with reliability and availability, security is one of the basic disciplines of 
network resilience. Under this context, security issues can be addressed using the two-phase 
ResiliNets strategy D
2
R
2
+DR, designed to improve network resilience in general [2]: the first 
phase of this strategy (D
2
R
2
) runs in real time and corresponds to the Defend, Detect, 
Remediate and Recover steps, while the second phase (DR) runs in background and includes 
the Diagnose and Refine steps. The model presented below is based on two basic 
assumptions: (i) network and host defenses can be broken and hosts can be infected by 
malware, becoming members of Botnets; (ii) current techniques and resources can detect the 
infection of hosts and the presence of Botnet activities in a local network. This means that 
this work will be focused in modeling the Remediate and Recover steps of the ResiliNets 
strategy, in the presence of Botnet threats. 
4.1 The network model 
The model considers a typical local network environment, where it is necessary to model 
the response behavior of the following actors: hosts, layer 2 devices (switches, wireless 
access points, etc) and routers. When considering the perspective of an individual host that is 
connected to the local network and can be infected by some piece of malware, becoming 
member of a spam Botnet, the following states and transitions can be identified: 
 Normal state (hS1): the host is not infected with malware. The following transition 
action will affect this state:  
o Malware infection (hS1_a1): the detection of malware implies the change of the host 
to the Infected state. 
 Infected state (hS2): some piece of spam malware was detected at the host. This state 
if affected by the following transition actions: 
o Automatic clean system (hS2_a1): if automatic defenses (e.g. anti-virus software) are 
able to fight this infection, the system can return to the Normal state;  
o Filtering malicious traffic (hS2_a2): if the defensive actions cannot automatically 
clean the system, the malicious traffic (i.e. spam messages) must be filtered in the local 
gateway/router and the host state will change to Quarantine. 
 Quarantine state (hS3): if the infection cannot be automatically removed, the host 
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must be quarantined. This state can be changed by the following actions: 
o Manual clean system (hS3_a1): if a manual cleaning of the system with existing 
tools (e.g. anti-virus) is successful, this implies the host transition to the Cleaned state; 
o Block all network traffic (hS3_a2): if manual cleaning with existing tools is not 
possible and additional and more complex tasks are needed, the host transits to a 
disconnected mode, with the consequent blocking of all network traffic in the corresponding 
switch port or wireless connection. 
 Disconnected state (hS4): if the infection cannot be controlled in a short time and is 
affecting the security and performance of other external elements, then the host must be 
temporarily disconnected from the network. This state can be changed only by the following 
action: 
o Offline clean system (hS4_a1): the system is cleaned with available tools and 
resources, definitively eliminating the threat. In some cases, a complete system formatting 
and re-installation should be necessary. If the action succeeds, the host transits to the Cleaned 
state.  
 Cleaned state (hS5): after the quarantine or disconnected period, the host transits to 
the cleaned state, where all the previously applied contention measures are removed. The 
following action will change the system to the Normal state: 
o Permit all network traffic (hS5_a1): when the threat is definitively eliminated from 
the host, all the traffic filters that were previously activated can be removed and the host will 
transit again to normal operation state. 
The finite state machine that represents all these states and transitions is represented in 
Fig. 11. The solid lines correspond to actions that occurred in the host while the dashed lines 
correspond to actions that occurred in other actors: hS2_a2 is applied at the local 
gateway/router, while hS3_a2 is applied at the layer 2 device where the host is directly 
connected to. Action hS5_a1 is applied in both the gateway and the layer 2 device. 
 
Figure 11. Finite state machine of an individual host. 
In the same way, it is relevant to identify and characterize the states of layer 2 devices. 
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Since these devices physically interconnect network hosts, they represent the first point 
available to control the connect/disconnect tasks corresponding to each host. The states and 
relevant actions are: 
 Normal state (lS1): if no actions are taken to disconnect a host from the network, all 
switch ports/wireless connections are in normal operation (enabled). The following action 
changes this state: 
o Block first connection (lS1_a1): if a first host connected to this device transits from 
the Quarantine to the Disconnected state, the corresponding switch interface or the wireless 
connection needs to be blocked (disabled), and the layer 2 device transits to the Blocking 
state. 
 Blocking state (lS2): when the first host connected to this device transits from the 
Quarantine to the Disconnected state, the layer 2 device transits from Normal to Blocking 
state, disabling the corresponding switch port or wireless connection in order to block the 
physical connectivity for that host. This state remains active until no more switch or wireless 
connections are disabled due to this reason. The following actions occur in this state: 
o Release connection (lS2_a1): if a host connected to this device changes from 
Disconnected to Cleaned state and is not the last host in this situation, then this action is 
performed, restoring the corresponding physical connectivity. The layer 2 device remains in 
the same Blocking state until there are no more locally disconnected hosts;  
o Block connection (lS2_a2): if the layer two device is already in the Blocking state 
and a new locally connected host transits to Disconnected state, then this action is executed, 
blocking the corresponding switch interface or wireless connection;  
o Release last connection (lS2_a3): if the last host that was in the Disconnected state 
transits to the Cleaned state, then the corresponding connection is restored and the switch 
comes back to the Normal state. 
Fig. 12 shows the finite state machine corresponding to the layer 2 devices. 
  
Figure 12. Finite state machine of the layer 2 devices. 
The last relevant actor is the local gateway/router that interconnects different IP networks 
of the LAN. The states and actions that characterize this device are: 
 Normal state (gS1): if no malware activities were detected in the local network, the 
router is operating in the normal state. The following actions will change its state: 
o Add first host traffic filters (gS1_a1): if the first malicious activities related with 
spam malware were detected in the local network and cannot be automatically removed, it is 
necessary to activate filters that can prevent malicious traffic from going outside. This action 
activates a filter rule to control the malicious traffic of the first local host that changed the 
state from Infected to Quarantine, making the router transit to the Filtering state; 
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o Blocking all traffic (gS1_a2): if an unexpectedly generalized contamination with 
spam malware is detected in the local network, this action immediately blocks all local traffic 
from going outside, changing the state of the router directly from Normal to the Blocking 
state.  
 Filtering state (gS2): in this state, the router is filtering malicious (spam) traffic from 
infected local hosts and can be subject to the following actions: 
o Remove host traffic filters (gS2_a1): this action occurs when a quarantined host, 
which was not the last in this state, is cleaned. In this case, the filter rules corresponding to 
this host are no longer needed and are disabled; 
o Remove last host traffic filters (gS2_a2): this action occurs if the last quarantined 
host of the local network was cleaned. This implies changing the router to the Normal state; 
o Add new host traffic filters (gS2_a3): this action is performed when a new host is 
quarantined, activating new traffic filters for that host; 
o Blocking all traffic (gS2_a4): if the threat increased significantly and cannot be 
contained using only filters for malicious traffic, it can be necessary to activate more 
restrictive filters that block all traffic until the threat is controlled or eliminated. In this case, 
the router transits to the Blocking state. 
 Blocking state (gS3): the router is in this state if one or more interfaces need to block 
all traffic. The device leaves this state by the influence of the following actions: 
o Permit all network traffic (gS3_a1): this action removes the filters that are blocking 
all traffic from one or more router interfaces. It is activated whenever the threats that 
previously implied the activation of these filters are definitively eliminated; 
o Remove blocking all traffic (gS3_a2): this action is activated if the generalized 
infection is controlled but not definitively eliminated. In this case, the rule that blocks all 
traffic in an interface is removed but the individual rules that filter malicious spam traffic for 
quarantined hosts remain active.  
Fig. 13 presents the finite state machine corresponding to the router. 
  
Figure 13. Finite state machine of the local gateway. 
Considering that some of the actions taken to control and solve the host infection are 
implemented at the layer 2 device and/or the local gateway, Fig. 14 presents the interaction 
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between these three elements. The dashed lines represent transitions of an actor from one 
state to another caused by actions that occurred in another different actor. For example, the 
Host transits from the Infected to the Quarantine state by the effect of an action filtering 
malicious traffic that is applied in the Gateway through an action that adds host traffic filters. 
  
Figure 14. Interaction between host, router and layer 2 devices. 
Following the previous analysis that considered the behavior of an individual host faced 
to a possible infection, it is now time to consider the states and behaviors of all local network 
as a set of hosts that can be infected with spam malware. Thus, we now identify the possible 
states, and associated actions, of the local network, when one or more local hosts are faced to 
a possible spam Botnet infection: 
 Normal state (nS1): in this state, the network is working according to its baseline, 
without strange events originated by the presence of spam malware running on hosts. The 
transition to another states is affected by the following actions: 
o Small Botnet Infection (nS1_a1): if a Botnet infection is detected, with a small 
number of hosts transiting from Normal to the Infected state, the network changes from the 
Normal to the Low Infection state; 
o Medium Botnet Infection (nS1_a2): this action is performed when an infection 
suddenly affects a large number of hosts in the local network, transiting them from Normal to 
Infected state. As a result, the network state transits from Normal to Medium Infection state; 
o Massive Botnet Infection (nS1_a3): if an unexpected massive Botnet infection is 
detected, the network changes directly from the Normal to the Generalized Infection state; 
 Low Infection state (nS2): a small number of infections on local hosts were detected 
but their impact in the overall network performance and security is not very significant. The 
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transitions that affect this state are: 
o Increased Botnet Infection (nS2_a1): if the previously detected spam Botnet 
infection spreads to a significant number of hosts, the network changes from the Low 
Infection state to the Medium Infection state;  
o Recovery measures (nS2_a2): the deployment of adequate recovery measures was 
able to eliminate the security threat, allowing the network to recover to the Normal state. 
 Medium Infection state (nS3): in this state, a large set of local hosts is infected with 
spam malware and their activity impacts network performance. 
o Remediation measures (nS3_a1): the application of remediation measures, namely 
the filtering of malicious traffic by the router, results in an improvement of the network 
performance and transits the network to the Low Infection state; 
o Increased Botnet Infection (nS3_a2): the massive spread of the infected hosts forces 
the transition of the network state from the Medium Infection to the Generalized Infection 
state. 
o Blocking all traffic (nS3_a3): if the network performance is significantly degraded 
by the influence of the infected hosts, it can be necessary to immediately block all network 
traffic directed to outside, transiting the network to the Quarantine state. 
 Generalized Infection state (nS4): a very significant number of hosts is infected, 
implying a big impact on the overall performance of the local network. The transitions from 
this state are affected by the following actions: 
o Remediation measures (nS4_a1): the deployment of remediation measures that 
confine the problem inside certain acceptable levels allow the network to return to the 
Medium Infection state; 
o Blocking all traffic (nS4_a2): if the generalized infection cannot be controlled within 
a certain limited amount of time, it can be necessary to transit the network state to Quarantine, 
blocking all network traffic directed to outside. 
 Quarantine state (nS5): the previous detection of a generalized infection on local 
hosts (or an infection with a big impact on network performance) implied the quarantine of 
the network, blocking all traffic exchanged (in the router) with other IP networks. The 
transitions from this state are affected by the following actions: 
o Remediation measures (nS5_a1): the application of remediation measures can 
alleviate the degradation of network performance, allowing the transition to the Medium 
Infection state; 
o Significant Remediation measures (nS5_a2): in some cases, it may not be feasible to 
solve the complete infection in a short time, but the applied remediation measures can 
significantly recover the performance of the network and limit the damage of the infection. 
With this action, the network can move from Quarantine to Low Infection state. 
o Recovery measures (nS5_a3): the deployment of adequate recovery measures that 
definitively eliminate the threat, allowing the network to recover to the Normal state. 
Figure 15 graphically represents the finite state machine of the local network, including 
the five states that were proposed and the transition actions between them. 
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Figure 15. Finite state machine of the local network. 
From this discussion, it is clear that the states and transition actions corresponding to the 
three identified actors are completely interrelated. Figure 16 tries to integrate the finite state 
machine of each element (local network as a set of hosts, layer 2 devices and local gateway), 
producing an overall picture of the system. The color scheme tries to give a visual idea of the 
network health, from the light (healthy) to the dark states (completely sick). 
The knowledge of the real network state, influenced by the presence of Botnet activities, 
is fundamental to take the right decisions and apply the most effective countermeasures. This 
knowledge is only possible after inferring all the network model parameters from real and/or 
reliable network data. 
4.2 From the inference of the model parameters to network management 
In a first phase, network data reflecting normal activity and anomalous behaviors induced 
by the presence of different Botnet types should be collected, analyzed and correlated in order 
to understand which anomalies have occurred and how they can be characterized. The 
characterization of each anomaly should be as complete as possible, including the amount of 
data that is generated (alert messages, traffic amount on the different network links, 
anomalous information on log files, etc), the timing parameters associated to the anomaly 
(like, for example, the duration of its characteristic segments) and the transition probabilities 
between the different states that characterize the anomaly, among other relevant statistics. The 
data collection step should involve the deployment of laboratorial testbeds where the different 
security threats can be easily installed in a controlled environment, analyzed and 
characterized. 
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Figure 16. Finite state machine of the overall local network. 
The network modeling framework is a multistage space state process able to model the 
number of error or alert messages and the different states of the network in terms of security 
threats. Each state is characterized by the type of generation process (deterministic, 
exponential or other) and its corresponding parameters. The dynamics of the state transitions 
are heterogeneous and can be ruled by deterministic or exponential processes that define the 
time of permanence in each state and the destination of the next transition. The modeling 
framework parameterization will agree with the assumption that state transitions can follow a 
deterministic or random distribution. State transitions are ruled in parallel by two (or more) 
parametric matrices that define, respectively, the next transitions after a deterministic amount 
of time and the probabilistic transitions after a random period of time. The 
probabilistic/random transitions can follow an exponential distribution (like happens in 
Markovian models) or any other distribution. The information generation processes 
associated with each state will also be parameterized by two (or more) vectors defining, 
respectively, the deterministic values and distribution function parameters for the rates and 
amount of alert messages generated. 
The chain modulated nature of the modeling framework will allow the use of traditional 
mathematical tools to obtain the model resulting from the superposition of several models or 
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predict the network state at future time instants. The superposition of multiple models 
(corresponding to different independent networks or different network segments where a 
certain level of independence can be assumed) can be easily calculated using simple 
Kronecker sum and product operations. Besides, the chain nature of the resulting model will 
facilitate the prediction of future network states.  
5. Conclusions 
Among the different approaches that can be used to study the Botnet phenomenon, 
installing the appropriate malware, capturing the exchanged traffic and processing it in order 
to obtain relevant statistics that can be used to characterize each Botnet is of the most 
appropriate, being also immune to different types of restrictions. In this paper, we were able 
to characterize three relevant spam Botnets, Grum, Cutwail and Bobax, and the results 
obtained show that there are distinct features between them that can be explored to detect 
their activity. Having a systematic high value or abrupt peaks on the number of contacted 
peers was clearly an indication of a possible Botnet infection. Then, by looking to other 
statistics, such as the protocols distribution in the download or upload directions, the number 
of packets over time or the number of TCP packets with some flags (SYN, ACK, RST) set, it 
is possible to identify the specific Botnet that is active. 
Since Botnet threats are becoming more sophisticated, new systematic models are needed 
to achieve significant improvements in fighting them. This paper proposed a network model 
that is able to describe all network states and the network dynamics in the presence of 
security threats, especially those originated from Botnets, being the first step for a more 
embracing objective, the development of an integrated framework that is able to identify 
threats and deploy appropriate counter-measures. All actors, dimensions, states and actions 
that need to be taken into account at each moment were defined, allowing the future 
development of appropriate inference procedures that can infer the different model 
parameters based on real data. Having the ability to model all network states (from a security 
perspective), events and transitions will be extremely important for network administrators 
and end users, helping them choose the most appropriate actions/countermeasures for each 
specific situation.  
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